Quietly, Lyon Have Built An Academy To Be Envied

When Olympic Lyonnais wrapped up the French title in the spring of 2008, celebrations were muted.  This was their seventh consecutive title and a season where their dominance of French football was confirmed when they also won the Coupe de France.  There were few reasons to doubt that this success was about to end.

Ultimately it was ambition that got them.  For years Lyon had excelled domestically by matching their ability to snap up upcoming French talent with the willingness to sell their best players once a financially enticing offer came from overseas.   This served them well but in time it became restrictive.  Winning loses its attraction when it becomes too easy and that is what Lyon eventually starting experiencing.  They wanted something more; they wanted the Champions League.

As with so many other clubs they stretched themselves to try gain success in Europe by spending huge amounts on players who they hoped could help take them to the next level.  The purchase of Yoann Gourcuff, Lisandro Lopez, Aly Cissokho, Michel Bastos and Bafetimbi Gomis brought to an end their buy low, sell high policy.

Of course, it wouldn’t have been too bad if these players had succeeded in keeping their previous results.  Instead they were, to varying degrees, disappointments and this hit Lyon hard.  Their financial structure was delicately poised on the twin points of selling of players and Champions League qualification.  Suddenly they found themselves struggling to qualify to the latter whilst seeing their big investments fail from appreciating in value.

Inevitably they went down the path of others who over-stretched themselves in search of European glory.  Any players that were of interest got sold to plug the gap in their balance sheet and with them went their ambition.

Fortunately for them, they had a backup.

Even during the years of plenty, Lyon had always had the capacity to produce players.  Steed Malbranque, Sydney Govou and Karim Benzema had risen from Lyon’s own academy to the first team where they achieved success before going on to star elsewhere.  Now that the finances weren’t what they once were they just had to rely on their academy more heavily than before.

The result was a young side where up to nine players had come through Lyon’s academy.  They weren’t always the most consistent of challengers – as teams filled with young players invariably are - but theirs was invariably the most exciting French team.

This wasn’t a fluke.  Success at youth level never is.  Instead it was all part of Jean-Michel Aulas, Lyon’s long-standing president, plan.  Ever since 2008 Lyon have been trying to move to a new stadium which would give them a solid enough financial platform to really push on.  Due to a number of administrative and political stumbling blocks, this new stadium is still to get lift off.

In the meantime, Lyon’s investments have been going into their Tola Vologe centre where both the first and youth teams train.  This centre should be spoken of in the same reverential manner that is typically reserved for La Masia, such is the thinking that has gone into it.  More than €24 million has been spent to improve those facilities but more important than that is the whole structure that has been developed around their youth programme.

Lyon’s stronghold remains the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region where the club is based.  That is where they look for talent through the team headed by Gerard Bonneau.

Bonneau is one of the few people within Lyon’s whole system who not only did not play professionally with the club but was never a professional player anywhere.  Even so, he had been involved in the game for all of his working life and has been doing the job of heading Lyon’s academy’s youth scouting system since 2003 when he took over from the late Alain Thiry, himself a former Lyon player, for whom he had been an understudy for three years.

Those years working under Thiry were critical because Lyon is very much a club that believes in doing things on their own terms.  That is why the bulk of the people at the club are also former players with the majority having also come through the system.  They don’t talk about ‘the Lyon way’ but there is very much a distinct philosophy in place and the belief is that having people whose professional career was built on a foundation laid by that philosophy will be better placed to pass it on to others.

That is why Bonneau had to spend that apprenticeship so that he can tell his team of around twenty scouts – a quarter of whom are employed full time – what to look for.

Those criteria depend largely on what age of players they are looking for.  Size, however, is rarely an issue and what they look at is players’ technique, intelligence and athleticism.  The only exceptions is when it comes to bringing in central defenders and defensive midfielders for the older age groups where taller players remain the norm.

Indeed, Lyon have quite a history for producing players who aren’t the tallest.  In the 1970s, the Lyon strikers Bernard Lacombe, Serge Chiesa and Fleury Di Nallo were nicknamed "the three elves". Forty years on, their main offensive players – Alexandre Lacazette, Nabil Fekir, Jordan Ferri – who have come through the youths system also all measure less than 1.80 m.

"Once the Xavi-Iniesta double pivot in midfield became the reference, the whole world has been trying to learn how to work like the Spanish team. But at Lyon, we have long been smaller than our opponents in most youth matches,” Bonneau said when this was pointed out to him.

This might not seem significant but is in fact quite countercultural.  French academies have often been accused of preferring the muscular players in the heart of midfield rather than those who favour flair.  At Lyon that isn’t the case.

Indeed, having smaller players coming up against bigger ones during academy games is often looked upon favourably. “They compensate for their lack of size with an iron will" U19 coach Joël Fréchet (again, another former Lyon player) has said in the past.

Mental strength along with character are the other big thing at Lyon.  No cost is spared in this respect, with Aulas having argued that "Lyon must become leader also in this type of research."

As such, psychologists monitor the players individually to determine how they are progressing whilst researchers from the University of Lyon test the collective and social openness of the youth teams.  Everything is logged, monitored and adjusted to ensure that there is a cohesive spirit where individual talent – whilst encouraged – does not come at the expense of team spirit.

This means a readiness to let go of players who do not show that they have the mental attitude that they require.  “"We have had too many disappointments,” Aulas has lamented, referring to players like Hatem Ben Arfa and Herold Goulon. “To avoid this, we have redefined the profile that we look for so that we exclude selfish behaviour. Today, the first concern is over ethical potential."

Bonneau echoes this.  “We are very careful about the mindset, their attitude in school, the general behaviour with the authority and ability to work, to put in an effort".

“Talent is not enough, the mind makes the difference."

What they look for are players like Anthony Martial who moved to Lyon from Paris.   Initially he struggled to adapt to Lyon’s disciplined approach that requires that players do their homework after training finishes after five in the evening and that lights are switched off at ten. It is such discipline that helps make men and dedicated professionals.

Lyon’s attention to detail is such that they have now invested in the use of NeuroTracker, a tool that is also used by Manchester United, which measures and improves the cognitive skills of its users.  Essentially, this helps players’ perceptions of how the game is flowing around them and allows them to improve their ability to think faster during matches.  Given how essential speed of thought and match intelligence are becoming in modern football, the importance of such tools is significant.

They do not rely exclusively on such tools, however.  Indeed, that is why they insist on former players to coach their youths.  Stephane Roche – who played for Lyon before embarking on a coaching career that eventually saw him take over as the head of their academy when Remi Garde joined the senior side – explains that “it is essential for these young people to be less guided by former players."   It is such coaches who have the big game experience needed to show them how to act during games.

For all the experience and success that they have built up over the years, Lyon’s task is becoming increasingly more difficult.  Bonneau explains that “the important thing is not to destabilize lives”, which is why their focus is predominantly on the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region.  They don’t even have people looking at players overseas, where the only pointers they get are from Florian Maurice (again, another former Lyon player) who works predominantly for the first team but keeps an eye out for any interesting young players that he might notice.

That however might have to change in the future given that there are always others – such as the big English clubs – who are always ready to pay big sums money to attract youth players whilst the shadow of Paris St Germain also looms large at this level: they are increasingly going into Lyon’s territory to attract youth players.

Despite all the changes, their strength remains in their philosophy.  "We are very sensitive to the human aspect,” Bonneau details.  “Our setting is familiar and we will strive to keep our identity.  We have a recognised approach.  The aim is to consolidate our values and export this model.”

“We have to stay true to our convictions."

Interested in football coaching?  Check out the Blueprint According To... e-book series where coaches are interviewed about their ideas on the game.

Editorial Note: An earlier version erroneously stated that Maxwell Cornet was a product of the Lyon academy.  In fact, he was signed from Metz.

Gambardella 2008, stronger than Gambardella 2003?

Original text in French by Sylvain Sro, translated by Puchkin

Let it be known, 2010-2011 is the season in which the “Gambardella 2008” generation took over at the Stade Rennais. In the stride of M’Vila and Brahimi, will they be able to do better than their predecessors of 2003, led by Briand and Gourcuff? This is what the club seems to think, building an important part of its short-term future on their talent.

Yohann Gourcuff

The same Stade de France, the same triumphant victory, the same joy on the pitch. Five years apart, the Stade Rennes U18 won the Gambardella Cup, the most prestigious national competition for youth teams. 2003 or 2008, each promotion had its stars: Briand, Gourcuff or Faty on one side; M’Vila, Brahimi and Souprayen on the other. And above all, the promise of a golden generation expected to feed the professional squad with both quantity and quality.

The 2003 winners blossomed under Bölöni’s management, and most of them are still making their way at the highest level nowadays. Meanwhile, the 2008 winners are progressively settling in under Antonetti’s guidance, and constitute the base of this young team beginning a cycle, so much vaunted since last July.

Integration to the first team: Draw
Both generations have got one thing in common: Almost all of the players that composed them have turned professional. This is anything but usual for teams reaching that level. As a proof, from the Strasbourg team encountered by Rennes in the 2003 final, only Habib Bellaïd and Éric Mouloungui have remained to professional football.

Jimmy Briand

In Rennes, thirteen of the fourteen players used during the final eventually turned pro [1], with midfielder Fabien Dugaz the only exception. Even better, nine of these professional careers have been launched at the Stade Rennais, with four of the dropped players looking for their fortune elsewhere, such as Sébastien Le Toux in the United States. Naturally, all of them did not manage great professional careers, including those kept by the club: Only four made a real impact in the professional squad (Bourillon, Briand, Faty and Gourcuff), two more being limited to moderate success with the “Rouge et Noir” (Mvuemba et N’Guéma) while the last three failed to deliver (Jonathan Bru, Chaigneau and Arthur Sorin).

On this aspect, the 2008 generation seems to follow a very similar way. Out of the fourteen players used at the Stade de France by Laurent Huard and Régis Le Bris [2], eleven have turned professional in Rennes, one did it elsewhere (Louhoungou) and two were force to abandon, at least for some time, their dreams of professional football (M’Laab and Pivaty, both gone for CFA teams)

Several new professionals have already left the club however (Lasimant, Le Marchand, Le Tallec and Petit), and the Rennes future of two other remains uncertain (Caro and Pajot will see their contract expire at the end of the season). At this moment, only five of them have made their way to Rennes’ professional team (Brahimi, Camara, M’Vila, Souprayen and Théophile-Catherine), not far over their 2003 predecessors.

Gambardella 2003 : A lukewarm success
What summary could be done, in terms of the generation 2003’s contribution? It was very important, and highly frustrating at the same time.

2002, the club is in full doubt, still bogged down in the monumental and costly recruitment errors made during summer 2000. Christian Gourcuff’s spell was a complete failure, and Rennes was struggling to deal with its nouveau riche club image, setting European targets but fighting against relegation. An obvious fact is raised: The Academy, which already produced very good players during the previous decade, is under-used. François Pinault made the choice to offer it a quadrupled budget, and the club’s objective clearly became to lay the foundations of the professional squad on it, with a policy aiming to see 50% of the playing staff trained at the club’s Academy.

Laszlo Boloni

For that purpose, the 2003 victory arrived in ideal time: Even though the players in this generation were all recruited before 2002 and therefore not the result of this new policy, their victory was making their integration in the professional squad even more legitimate. Recruited in part for his ability to launch youngsters, Laszlo Bölöni had full latitude to launch a new cycle, quickly based on this wave of youth. The rise of this generation remained progressive however: Although Faty and Bourillon were soon used to starting in Ligue 1, it took a bit more time for the others, such as Briand, or in a lesser extent Gourcuff.

In the latter’s wake, this generation’s input reached its summit between 2006 and 2007, without managing to reach anything else than UEFA Cup qualifications. At the end of summer 2007, only one of the players remained at the club: Jimmy Briand. The 2003 generation had given a great contribution to the revival induced by Bölöni, but the club failed to gain full profit of it, as Gourcuff’s rushed departure to Milan AC symbolises.

Gambardella 2008 : A slower emergence
As opposed to its 2008 successor, the team that won in 2003 had already gathered much experience. During the 2002-2003 season, Philippe Bergeroo and Vahid Halilhodzic had not hesitated to throw Grégory Bourillon (21 games in L1), Jacques Faty (9 games), Stéphane N’Guéma (5 games) and Jimmy Briand (1 game) at the deep end.

Damien Le Tallec

In 2008, nothing like that : Sure, Damien Le Tallec has already been a professional for a year, but none of the players involved has been given any competitive experience in “senior” football. This would not stop the Rennes team to manage its game to the perfection, just like M’Vila, already displaying his serene leadership at midfield.

The following season, while Bölöni had decided to rely on the rising generation, Guy Lacombe left it completely on the side of the road. In 2008-2009, only Théophile-Catherine made a bit of a breakthrough in the professional squad, with two starts in the Coupe de la Ligue. Camara and Lasimant were also offered a few minutes in the season’s last match in Marseille, as the manager’s departure had already been confirmed.

To Lacombe’s credit, he was not facing the same context as his predecessor. Bölöni, searching for a competitive team, could easily take the time for tries and introduce youngsters to Ligue 1. In 2008-2009 however, Rennes was a well-oiled formation, able to manage 18 consecutive games without a loss, and therefore not as easily modifiable. The patience of Rennes’ youngsters was severely tested, too severely for one of them, Damien Le Tallec, who decided to quit Rennes’ Reserve to join Borussia Dortmund’s

The loans as an indicator
One could think that Frédéric Antonetti’s arrival, in June 2009, was opening the generation 2008’s era. It is both true and false. In 2009-2010, only two players were introduced to Ligue 1: M’Vila, who appeared immediately as a future international to Antonetti, and Théophile-Catherine who, as under Lacombe’s management, was only offered limited time on the pitch. Nothing too exciting at first sight.

But this time, the solution was to loan. For the 2003 generation, that strategy had been used in diverse ways, to relaunch N’Guema, to offer Arthur Sorin some playing time, or to try and sell Mvuemba or Chaigneau.

Encouraged by Sow’s spell in Sedan, the management made a massive use of loans in Ligue 2. A successful strategy, which allowed the youngsters to gain experience without fighting the competition in an overcrowded squad, which only M’Vila’s talent and maturity could overcome without resistance.

Yacine Brahimi

The five loaned players (Brahimi, Camara, Lasimant, Le Marchand and Souprayen) totalled over two hundred games played in one season. A good inspiration, especially since the strategy also helps defining which of the five could become key players in the first team. In summer 2010, Brahimi and Souprayen had become candidate to starting slots, Camara was left in stand-by provisionally, while Lasimant and Le Marchand, not as convincing during their respective loans, where left to find a new team. Vincent Pajot, on loan at Boulogne this season, knows ehat he has to do in order to cement a place at the Stade Rennais next year…

Today, in terms of high-level experience (Ligue 1 or Ligue 2), the 2008 generation has nearly caught up with his 2003 predecessor. Cleverly, Stade Rennes also managed to avoid a sometimes difficult period of integration for its young players. Arnold Mvuemba or Florent Chaigneau could witness of the difficulties inherent to professional beginning. The first took years to affirm himself, before finally blossoming in Lorient, the second sought completely after a string of catastrophic games.

Note : The graph above represents the evolution of the number of games played by the two generations over time, after their Gambardella Cup victory. In 2003 (blue curve), some players had already gathered some professional experience. The progression in the number of games is consistent, before gaining in intensity in 2005-2006 (2 to 3 years after the final). After Gourcuff’s departure, the curve returns to normal, before lowering strongly at +4 years, when Bourillon and Faty quit Brittany, leaving only Briand behind them.

In 2008 (Red and Orange curves), the arrival in the first team is happening later, with the players only reaching in Summer 2010 (+2 years) the total already played by the 2003s. A misleading assessment: By including all the Ligue 2 games played during their loan, the players have nearly caught up, in one year, the experience that their 2003 predecessor had acquired in three seasons. The projections made (in dotted lines) according to the number of games played since the beginning of the season, show a constant increase, and nearly equal to the 2003 players’ best score (2005-2006 season). An increase which is destined to be accentuated even more, if Souprayen or Brahimi were to become regular starters.

An difference in emergence, as a good omen?

Yann M'Vila

Finally, except for the only M’Vila, players from the 2008 generation are playing their first full season at Stade Rennais in 2010-2011. An emergence that comes with a two year difference with their from 2003 launched very (too?) early in the first team. If Stade Rennes manages to keep its youngsters – and the club did work this way by extending most of their contracts until 2014 -, they should only be giving the full measure of their potential next season, or during the 2012-2013 season.

Older, and strenghtened by one additional year of Ligue 2 experience, they give much more guarantees than their predecessors. Samuel Souprayen, who is still to complete his breakthrough in the first team, had already shown that he could be a key player in Ligue 2. Enough to create relation of mutual trust between the player and the club, which would have been difficult to instate if he had remained with the reserve squad for one more year.

« I think we are reaching a real turning point, Jérôme Leroy affirmed on 21st December. The potential is there. […] If you keep these youngsters, they are the future at Rennes. Look what Lille has done, they have kept a lot of players since three-four years, and they have become key-players”.

Off to a good start in the League during this 2010-2011 season, everything seems to be shaping up well for Rennes and its «Gambardella 2008» generation. Better, it seems that this generation is far from having shown all its potential yet. A sign, maybe, that glorious tomorrows are well on their way…

Footnotes
[1] The squad for the 2003 final: Chaigneau, Le Toux, Macé (Sorin, 84’), Bourillon, Faty, Dugaz, Mvuemba, Bru, Briand, Gourcuff (Benchenaa, 75’), N’Guéma (Stanger, 84’).

[2] The squad for the 2008 final: Petit, Théophile-Catherine, Louhoungou, Souprayen (cap), Le Marchand, M’Vila, Pajot, Brahimi (Caro, 77’), Lasimant, Le Tallec (Pivaty, 86’), M’Laab (Camara, 64’)

With thanks to the very kind people at Stade Rennais Online who have allowed us to reproduce this wonderful piece.